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This paper reviews the use and structure of commodity-linked credit instruments. It is 
argued that in the absence of contingent markets food firms face increasing financial risk 
reduced investment, and limited access to debt markets. One strategy is to issue 
commodity-linked credit whose payment structure is linked to the price of an underlying 
commodity. In some cases, a commodity-linked bond (CLB) can be structured to provide 
an incentive to investors by sharing in profit gains. If the goal is to hedge financial risks, 





 One of the most important managerial roles facing the agriculture and food industry is 
the management of business risks arises from commodity price fluctuations. The 
prevalence of these risks affects not only capital structure decisions on the optimal 
balance between debt and equity but also the timing of commitments for capital 
investment. Unmanaged, business risks give rise to higher costs of capital and volatile 
share prices. To mitigate risks a number of financial instruments such as forward 
contracts, futures, swaps, and options have been developed and most companies have 
established risk management strategies. For example farmers, grain marketers and other 
sellers of commodities can hedge there risk by taking short positions in futures markets or 
purchasing put options, while buyers of commodities can hedge risk by taking long 
positions in futures contracts or buying call options.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine a different class of structured financial 
products, collectively referred to as Commodity-Linked Credit Instruments, that links the 
payoff from a derivative such as a forward contract, futures contract, or option to the 
repayment covenants of a loan or bond. In section II we discuss the relationship between 
financing, hedging, and investment, Section III introduces the structure of a commodity-
linked bond and discusses how they can be used to balance business and financial risk for 
the food industry. Section IV develops a general framework to support the main 
contentions, from a finance point of view, of sections II and III. Section V provides an 
overview of CLB pricing issues including convenience yield, interest rate risk, 
convenience yields and bankruptcy risk. Section V concludes with a general model 
framework based upon the work of Harrison and Kreps (1979). Section VI delves into 
structure issues in more depth. While the models of section V provide a framework for 
understanding CLBs in general, in practice  firms that have issued commodity-linked 
bonds have used a variety of different structures. Therefore, section VI builds on the 
review in Attah Mensa (1992) by reconstructing the payoff  or boundary conditions to a 




  1II.  Hedging, Business Risk,  and Financial Risk 
Hedging strategies that affect financial decisions and capital structure have not been 
widely studied. On the one hand it is well known that there are agency costs associated 
with business risks, particularly in the pricing and access to credit and credit markets. In 
agriculture Collins (1985) and Featherstone, Moss, Preckel and Baker (1988) have argued 
that total risk is the sum of business risk plus financial risk, and financial risk is defend as 
the incremental increase in the variability of the return on equity due to increased debt 
use.  From this emerges the risk-balancing hypothesis that in order to maintain constancy 
in total risk any increase in leverage will need to be offset by a decrease in business 
(operating) risk. The corollary is that any actions taken to reduce business risk, relaxes 
constraints that limit the use of debt. In turn agency costs associated with the imposition 
of price or non-price credit rationing will be reduced. Results by Turvey and Baker 
(1989, 1990), and Mello and Parsons (2000) show that a firm with no debt gains little 
from hedging its price risks because the agency costs of debt are reduced or zero. 
However, zero debt is often suboptimal from a shareholder value point of view.   
Hedging involves a transaction that shifts risks from states in which the 
opportunity cost of liquidity are low to those in which the opportunity costs of liquidity 
are high (Mello and Parsons, 2000). In this sense the purpose of hedging is to improve 
liquidity, reduce financial distress and the costs of external financing, and make value 
maximizing investments affordable. In addition, maintained liquidity provides the 
flexibility to undertake and plan future investment opportunities (Mello and Parsons, 
2000) and thus the value of growth options implicit in a hedging strategy can lead to 
higher firm value. It has been argued by Mayers and Smith (1987) and Morrelec and 
Smith (2003) that hedging policies also allows the firm to control the underinvestment 
incentives associated with debt financing by increasing the number of states of nature in 
which shareholders are residual claimants. This is part of the free cash flow hypothesis of 
Jensen (1986) that argues that share prices will generally rise as residual cash above 
precommitted capital expenditures rise. Hedging strategies that reduce or eliminate low 
or negative free cash flow states of nature can lead to increases in firm value.   
The forgoing provides a strong argument that commodity-based firms need to 
look at their risk management, capital structure and investment decisions as a 
simultaneous strategy, rather than separate managerial tasks. This process of strategic risk 
management has started in part to the real options paradigm in which a positive NPV 
investment might be postponed until certain underlying uncertainties or ambiguities are 
resolved. If, as in the food industry, the major cause of uncertainty is commodity price 
risk, and commodity price risk can be managed through hedging strategies, then the 
option to wait can be reduced significantly by altering the project’s risk profile and the 
smooth pasting condition. At this point one can play a thought experiment on how 
financing the project or firm fits into the paradigm. As argued by Turvey and Baker 
(1989) and Mello and Parsons (2000) the purpose of a hedge is to provide needed 
liquidity in those price states of nature that need them most. This in turn increases debt 
capacity and reduces the cost of debt. Using this debt capacity to finance the project 
increases free cash flow and reduces the weighted average cost of capital. Increasing free 
cash flow will generally increase the value of common stock (Smith 1986) and 
decreasing the cost of capital will increase firm value via a ceterus paribus increase in the 
project’s net present value. 
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III.   The Case for Commodity-Linked Bonds 
In a perfect capital market hedging, financing and investment strategies can be 
viewed as separate transactions (Mello and Parsons 2000). For example a firm can 
borrow funds in one market while making hedging strategies in another. Keeping in mind 
the claim that hedging strategies are ineffectual for firms with no or little debt, the 
optimal strategy would be to link the hedging strategies with the financing strategies. In 
the alternative, if markets are not perfect, management may wish to issue a single credit 
instrument, a commodity-linked bond (CLB) for example, that combines both under one 
covenant. Broadly defined, these Commodity-linked bonds (CLBs) are debt instruments 
with a payment structure that is contingent on the outcomes of one or more underlying 
commodities. There are two types of commodity-linked bonds: the forward type and the 
option type (Attah Mensa 1992). With commodity bonds of the forward type, the coupon 
and/or principal payment to the bondholder are linearly related through a forward or 
futures contract to the price of a stated amount of the reference commodity. With 
commodity bonds of the option type, the coupon payments are similar to that of a 
conventional bond, but, upon maturity, the bondholder receives the face value plus an 
option to buy or sell a predetermined quantity of the commodity at a specified price. A 
food-based firm that faces increasing downside risks as prices fall can secure debt 
repayment by issuing bonds or otherwise acquiring debt by directly linking to that debt a 
put option on the underlying commodity. Likewise, a firm that faces the risk of rising 
commodity prices can mitigate financial risk by linking to its debt a call option on the 
underlying commodity. Should prices fall (or rise) below a trigger the bond principal 
would be reduced. These bonds would be issued to the market at a discount. The implicit 
transaction is that the issuing firm is buying a put or call option (or equivalent contingent 
claim) from the investor.  A premium bond serves a different purpose. With these bonds 
the investor will share in the benefits of upside risk from the issuer. Implicitly the 
investor is purchasing a put (if the risk is that commodity prices fall) or call (if the risk is 
that commodity prices rise) option from the issuing firm. In either case the payoff from 
the option is used to secure the debt. On the supply side a firm would issue a CLB as part 
of its targeted risk management strategy, managing its balance sheet, or altering its 
capital structure with minimal impact on equity values. From the demand side, investors 
would purchase a CLB because they (usually) provide income through coupons, while 
allowing for diversification into commodity price risk, without being invested in 
commodities.  
The idea of linking commodity price risk to the value of a bond is not new. 
During the U.S. civil war the confederate states issued war bonds with the payoff value 
linked to the price of cotton. If cotton prices rose the notional value of the bond also rose. 
The purpose of the cotton linkage was to encourage investment in the bonds. Since then a 
variety of structured products have been developed to either mitigate the financial risks 
associated with holding the bonds, or to incentivise the purchase of a bond. A recent 
example of a commodity-linked products can be emphasized by a new (2004) investment 
grade bond offered by Barclays Capital referred to as a collateralized commodity 
obligation. With over $800m committed, these bonds pay regular coupons but repay the 
principal based on the performance of a basket of commodities including gold, copper 
and Brent crude oil. Funds raised from the issue are used to buy floating-rate notes and 
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the derivatives generates income to pay for coupons on the note. The attraction of the 
collateralized commodity obligations is that the coupons are higher than yields on fixed 
income investments. The bonds are not of the option type. The bet is that the swap will 
yield a higher return on the commodity basket prior to maturity. If the swap generates a 
loss, money from the original bond sale is used to offset the loss. Losses are borne by 
different classes of investors. Investors can opt for more risk in principal repayment for a 
higher coupon, while others can risk less principal but at a lower coupon. From a risk 
perspective, such vehicles are attractive because commodity markets are reasonably 
uncorrelated with other financial markets and can therefore be used as a portfolio hedge. 
Furthermore, investors can buy commodity risk through an investment vehicle, which is 
very similar to fixed income securities 
1.  
The Barclay product illustrates the appetite for investment in commodity linked 
financial products, but these were not issued by a commodity-based firm, but rather an 
investment house. In contrast, Chidambaran, Fernando and Spindt (1999) describe how in 
1993 and early 1994, Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc. facing a substantial 
financing problem for the expansion of its Grasberg gold and copper mine in Indonesia. , 
the world’s largest gold reserve and one of the world’s largest copper reserves. Freeport-
McMoRan needed to invest heavily in order to expand mine capacity and achieve the 
economies of scale required to be competitive. Despite a heavy debt burden and a stock 
that was trading below book value, Freeport-McMoRan raised $430 million through two 
series of gold-linked depositary shares at a cost below that of its existing debt. 
Chidambaran, Fernando and Spindt (1999)  showed that this credit enhancement was 
achieved because the link to gold prices credibly reduced default risk and the associated 
distress cost.  
Applications to agriculture and agribusiness have however been limited. Jin and 
Turvey (2002) illustrate how debt linked to commodities can be used by farmers, and 
Myers and Thompson, Myers, and Attah Mensa (1992) discuss the linking of commodity 
price risk to bond repayment in less developed countries. Using Costa Rica as a base case 
Myers and Thompson find that the country’s bond portfolio should include as much as 
30% commodity-linked debt. Innes (1993), offers a possible explanation of why CLB’s 
might not have taken root in agriculture. He develops a principle-agent model to 
investigate the potential moral hazard when the bond repayment is contingent on firm 
output and firm output in turn depends on managerial effort. He argues (in proposition 6) 
that if prices and outputs are independent then the optimum contract is a pure commodity 
contract which pays the minimum of a promised payout or the actual production (a result 
which is generalizeable to a price contingent contract if prices are a deterministic 
function of supply). This would hold for most atomistic  farms or firms that are price 
takers, but the notion of moral hazard in production of  firms whose processing or 
marketing activities can influence market prices may require a moral hazard premium 
that markets are not willing to bear. On the other hand O’Hara (1984, 1990) demonstrates 
that conventional loans can be pareto dominated by financial contracts explicitly 
incorporating characteristics of the borrower's product market, identifies conditions under 
which commodity-linked debt is desirable, when more complicated revenue-linked loans 
                                                 
1 By Dan Wilchins http://yahoo.reuters.com/financeQuoteCompanyNewsArticle.jhtml?duid=mtfh63325_2004-
12-07_23-12-00_n07291675_newsml 
  4are optimal, and how the type of lending contract can have real effects on production 
decisions.  
Firm solvency is also an issue. With limited liability a firm cannot be compelled 
to pay more than  its contingent profits. In this case, the optimum contract according to 
Innes (1993) is a pure bond with no price linkages. Schwartz (1982) examines a related 
issue that gives investors a claim to the assets of the firm in the case of bankruptcy, but 
the cost of the bond (i.e. its discount) will increase with the probability of bankruptcy.   
The use of commodity linked bonds is inexplicably tied to firm value and capital 
structure decisions. In regards to Commodity-Linked Bonds Miralloc and Smith (2003) 
have examined how firms jointly determine financing, hedging and investment decisions. 
They argue that optimum leverage reflects the tradeoff between under and over 
investment and show that hybrid debt financing comprised of a commodity linked bond 
of the forward type (i.e. with a linked forward contract) reduces agency costs and 
incentives to over and under investment, and increases firm value relative to standard 
debt financing. This implies that one of the advantages to issuing a CLB is that it 
precommits the firm to a hedging strategy for the life of the bond in an environment 
where covenants to using futures, options or swaps are prohibitive. The intuitive logic 
behind this idea is that by precommiting to a hedging strategy within the covenants of a 
bond, ensures that the investors are compensated for whatever risks are implied by the 
hedge. Without such precommitments bondholder covenants are designed to ensure that 
speculation in uncorrelated risks are limited by restricting all types of derivatives 
strategies.  
One of the criticisms of CLBs, at least for tradeable securities, is that the CLB can 
be constructed from issuing a bond and placing a separate hedge on the price risk. One 
might ask why CLBs need to be issued at all! Part of the answer, as discussed above, is 
that covenants on the bond issue may prohibit taking positions in forward or derivative 
markets. However,  Morellec and Smith (2003) also provide an argument by looking at 
what happens to firm value if shareholders unwind the commodity part by taking a long 
position in the forward contract. They show that while such a strategy will transfer cash 
from bondholders to shareholders, it will fail to maximize shareholder value because of a 
loss of control of deviations from investment policy, and that unwinding increases the 
price at which the firm defaults (increasing the probability of default).   
 
IV.   The Conceptual Frameowrk 
We define financial risk as the incremental increase in the variability of the return on 
equity due to financial leverage. We assume, for purposes of ease, that there is an 
identifiable mapping between the probability distribution of a commodity price (traded or 
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of business risk. Furthermore, the interest rate charged on loans or bonds will generally 
increase as either leverage, business risk, or both increase. We further define the ROE  
according to 
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Because commodity prices represent the sole source of variance in ROA, it is the sole 
source of business risk. For an unlevered firm, the variability in ROA will be the same as 
the variability in ROE. However as debt (D) rises relative to equity (E) variance in ROE 
rises. Thus total risk, the sum of business risk and financial risk, is captured by the 
variability in equity returns. To gain some insights into the relationship between the 
underlying business risk and debt, we totally modestly expand the model of Collins and 
Featherstone et al to examine the optimum debt structure. Assuming negative exponential 
utility and absolute risk aversion, λ, and defining the D/E ratio as δ, the expected utility 
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Clearly the optimal proportion of debt decreases with increases in business risk, and more 
so through increases in the interest rate. There is a simultaneity here that can be addressed 
through a structured CLB product, namely since the marginal change in interest rate is a 
function of business risk, then any actions to reduce business risk will allow for a risk-
balanced increase in debt. Looked upon another way, totally differentiate (4) to find the 
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  6This is not an uncommon results, and similar results can be found in the models of 
Collins (1985) and Featherstone, Moss, Preckel and Baker (1988). Essentially the result 
states that as underlying commodity price risks rise, there will be a decrease in debt in 
order to keep the change in total risk constant. This has been referred to as the risk 
balancing hypothesis. Essentially the economic argument is that as business risk increases 
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For a 1% increase in price risk. The reduction in debt depends on the ratio of  business 
risk to price risk, the debt to asset ratio and the marginal sensitivity of business risk to 
price risk.  
  We can also make an appeal to the Capital Asset Pricing Model to motivate the 
problem. It is well known that the estimated beta for stock of a leveraged firm will be 
higher than that of an unlevered firm with the same amount of systematic risk. Therefore, 
the security market line equation 
(10)  [] 1 fu m f
D
ER O E r r r
E
β    =+ + −    
 
with rf and rm being the risk free and market rates of return respectively, and βu the 
unlevered beta. The significance of this relationship is to indicate that as debt increases 
relative to equity the systematic risk increases as does the expected return on equity. This 
has two related impacts. First an increase in the market ROE increases the weighted 
average cost of capital which reduces the net present value of investments and second, an 
increase in equity returns and risk can lead to a reduction in share prices. 
  We can also examine the relationship between business risk, financial risk , cash 
flow and free cash flow. Net income is given by  
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and by adding depreciation and deducting precommitments to investment I*, free cash 
flow can be defined as 
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with the bracketed term representing operating cash flow. Under the Jenson (1986) free 
cash flow hypothesis firm value will increase with unexpected increases in the payout to 
corporate claimholders. Thus  an increase in free cash flow suggests, perhaps, additional 
dividends to shareholders. This will result if operating income increases or debt 
decreases.  
  We now deduct the cost of a precommited hedging strategy ω(Ω) where Ω 
represents the strategy. Substituting ω(Ω) into free cash flow and solving gives the 
critical ROA for which free cash flow is zero and below which free cash flow is negative. 
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Using (13)  the  variance of cash flow, and  free cash flow is given by 
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which again is determined by the business risk. This along with E[ROA] defines the 
probability distribution for cash flow. The expected value of  ROA conditional on the 
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where   is the probability distribution of prices received conditional on the 
hedging strategy and   is the critical price that gives 
( | ) fPΩ
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* ROA . The first integrand 
on the right hand side describes states for which free cash flow is negative. Over this 
domain, cash flow can only be restored by increased borrowing or raising cash from new 
equity. In this range share value will diminish. The second integrand of the right hand 
side describes states of nature for which free cash flow is increasing. Over this range  
management can increase dividends or repurchase shares. Prices will increase.  
The hedging variable Ω is a moderating variable. Its existence will reduce the 
variability and downside risk in ROA. If it is a hedge with a futures contract or a forward 
contract variance will be reduced on both the upper and lower tails. If agents are risk 
neutral, hedging might not affect share value at all, but if agents are risk adverse the 
marginal utility of a decrease in downside risk will more valuable than the disutility of 
lower upside potential and in this context share values may increase with the hedge. If Ω 
represents an option strategy then the lower probability tail will be truncated at some 
=P*. Assuming in this case that  
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fairly prices the transference of downside risk, and  ω(Ω) is a precommited expense, the 
truncation of downside risk increases the expected value of free cash flow and share 
prices will increase.  
  With these characteristics the problem faced by a commodity-based food firm 
becomes self evident when it wants to issue bonds to finance investments: In order to 
increase debt it must somehow take actions to reduce business risk. While the 
relationship between hedging price risks and financial leverage have been discussed 
previously (Turvey and Baker 1989) the idea of linking price risks as part of a structured 
debt product has not.  A review of the academic literature is presented in the next section. 
This is followed by a detailed review of a number of  structured products that have 
appeared as either an idea in the academic literature or implemented in practice. 
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V.  The Theoretical Framework for Commodity-Linked Bonds 
The academic literature has focused primarily on theoretical models of arbitrage 
priced to equilibrium. In most cases the standard model is provided with one or more of 
the following factors included: commodity price risk, interest rate risk, convenience yield 
risk, and firm value or bankruptcy risk. In practice, however, the structured models do not 
normally conform to what is described in theory and the theoretical models should more 
generally be considered as providing guiding principles. The standard model for pricing 
commodity-linked securities uses the option pricing framework as pioneered by Black 
and Scholes (1973) and extended by Merton (1973) and Cox and Ross (1976). Schwartz 
(1982) provides a general framework for valuing CLBs. He considers the underlying 
commodity price risk, default risk, and interest rate risk and provides a second–order 
partial differential equation in four variables that governs the value of CLBs at any point 
in time. Schwartz states that the solution to the general problem, subject to certain 
boundary conditions,  is difficult even by numerical methods, and he only provides some 
closed form solutions in special cases. In his paper there is no discussion about 
convenience yields. Carr (1987) derives a closed form pricing formula for a commodity-
linked bond where the bond prices follows a third order geometric Brownian motion 
(lognormal) without referring to the interest rate process. His formula encompasses 
Schwartz’s solution as a special case. However he leaves out the convenience yield from 
his model. 
Gibson and Schwartz (1990) consider stochastic convenience yields for the 
valuation of commodity derivatives. Assuming that the price of the underlying 
commodity has a lognormal stationary distribution and net marginal convenience yields 
follow the mean reverting pattern, they derive the partial differential equation for the 
price of commodity derivatives defined as functions of the underling commodity spot 
price and the net marginal convenience yields. They also estimate the parameters for the 
behavior of the net marginal convenience yield from market data, and then calculate 
numerically the futures price of the commodity. Schwartz (1997) extends this model by 
introducing a third stochastic factor, the instantaneous interest rates. Hilliard and Reis 
(1998) extend this three factors model by introducing jumps in the spot price of the 
commodity and by using the term structure of interest rate to eliminate the market price 
of interest rate risk in their fundamental price equation. Milterson and Schwartz (1998) 
develop a new arbitrage model that includes three factors: the spot price of the 
commodity, forward interest rates and convenience yields. They address issues about the 
forward interest rates and convenience yield based on the Heath-Jarrow-Morton (HJM 
1992) framework and obtain closed form solutions for options on commodity futures as 
well as commodity forwards in the Gaussian case. None of the above models actually 
considers the default of the issuing firms as the commodity contingent claims mature. 
Atta-Mensah (1992) established a general model for pricing CLBs, which 
includes four factors: the spot price of the underlying commodity, firm value, interest 
rates, and convenience yields. He follows Schwartz (1982) to derive a second-order 
partial differential equation as well as the boundary conditions. Recently, Miura and 
Yamauchi (1998) assume that both the spot price of the commodity and firm value 
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interest rate follow mean-reverting processes and then price CLBs. They derive the 
partial differential equation, which must be satisfied by the bond and obtain the 
mathematical formula for the price of CLBs.  Evnine (1983) extends the Cox, Ross, and 
Rubinstein (1979) option pricing model to incorporate an option on two or more stocks. 
Rajan (1991) applies  Evnine’s (1983) model to CLBs, prices CLBs in the presence of 
default risk and commodity price risk, and then compares his results to Schwartz’s (1982) 
results.  
In recent years the no-arbitrage model has been used to deal with the interest rate 
when pricing financial products (Hull, 2000). Ho and Lee (1986) present a no-arbitrage 
model and Hull and White (1990) extend the Ho and Lee (1986) model. Heath, Jarrow, 
and Morton (HJM) (1992) develop a general no-arbitrage model based on several factors 
and derive the relationship between the drift and standard deviation of an instantaneous 
forward rate.  
Kaldor (1939) first gives the definition for the convenience yield of a commodity 
in the economic literature, and then offers an explanation of the relationship between the 
spot and future prices of a commodity. Later many scholars such as Working (1948), 
Brennan (1958), and Frechette (1997)  reached the conclusion that the valuation equation 
for derivatives that are indexed to a commodity must take account of the convenience 
yield of the commodity linked to it. Fama and French (1987) provide evidence that the 
marginal convenience yield varies seasonally for most agricultural and animal products, 
and furthermore they find evidence of a mean-reverting process for metals’ convenience 
yield using futures data from the London Metals Exchanges (LME). Gibson and 
Schwartz (1990) find that a constant convenience yield assumption did not work well for 
pricing oil indexed bonds and argued that convenience yield needs to be explicitly 
considered in modeling any meaningful valuation model. For pricing commodity–linked 
bonds, Ingersoll (1982) points out that the convenience yield should be considered when 
pricing CLBs. Atta-Mensah (1992) assumes that the convenience yields follow the 
Brownian motion in his model. Miura and Yamauchi (1998) postulate that the 
convenience yields follow a mean-reverting process to value CLBs. Miltersen and 
Schwartz (1998) use the HJM approach for interest rates and convenience yields to value 
the options on commodity futures.  
The models developed to date are complex. Commodity-linked bonds as 
described above do not consider advanced features such as bankruptcy risk, stochastic 
interest rates or convenience yields. Bankruptcy risk was considered If there is a risk of 
bankruptcy (Schwartz (1982), Carr (1987) Miura and Yamauchi(1998)) then bondholders 
receive max of firm value or bond value, i.e.  
 
(17)  [ ] (, ) , (0, ) Tt B TM i n V F M a x P K =+ −  
 
Also complicating pricing issues is the fact that the Value of bond = present value of 
coupons plus present value of payoff. In other words interest rates and convenience yields 
convenience yields are not constant over time (Milterson and Schwartz, 1998). Several 
approaches to including interest rates and convenience yields into a CLB problem have 
been presented in the literature based on either Brownian motion or HJM framework. 
Following the structure outlined in Milterson and Schwartz (1998), Harrison & Kreps 
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0 (.,0) [ ] min ( ), max(0, )
vT
T fs s d s fs s d s
T BE e c d v E e V T F P K
−−   ∫∫ =+ + −  




f ssd s ∫  v=t,T is the adjusted discount rate which can include convenience 
yield and interest rate risk under a variety of assumptions. In the simplest of cases with 
zero default risk (exclude V(T)), a nonstoreable commodity (no convenience yield) and 
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This expression is exactly the same as the results obtained by Schwartz (1982) and Atta-
Mensah (1992) and is similar to the one used in Jin and Turvey (2002). To reduce this 
further, note that if F = 0, c = 0 (no bond), and interest rate =r (constant), then P (0, T) = 
exp(-r*T) and (19) reduces to the standard  Black (1976) model for pricing options on 
futures. In other words the simplest of structured products is simply the sum of the 
present value of the cash flow from the bond investment plus the option value of the 
commodity linkage. 
 
VI.  Commodity-Linked Bonds in Practice 
As indicated above, not all commodity –linked bonds follow the structure as 
described above. In practice, the types of CLBs that have been considered or issued have 
been varied. To gain a sense of the structure of these financial products, this section 
provides a review of various products described in the literature. For the most part he 
products in this section were described in Attah Mensah (1992) without explicit solutions 
or statements of the boundary conditions. Therefore, what follows is based on 
reconstructing these conditions based upon his written descriptions. In all cases it is 
assumed that interest rates are deterministic, bankruptcy risk is negligible, and 
convenience yields are zero (or at least deterministic). 
In 1981, Inco issued a $CDN90m bond that was linked to the price of copper and 
nickel. The bond had a fixed coupon rate of 10% per year but at maturity the face value 
or monetary value of the bond was tied to a specified amount of copper or nickel. The 
basic structure of this bond’s terminal value is given by 
 
(20)  [] 0
0
(, ) ,0 T
F
BT c F M a xP P
P
=+ + −  
 
Where F is the face value of the bonds, c, is the coupon, Po is the initial price of the 
underlying commodity  and PT is the price at expiration. The value of the bond is linked 
to a call option which allowed investors to share in any gains in the market value of the 
  11commodity between t=0 and t=T. However, if prices fell, investors were shielded from 
losses in principle. 
An example of a CLB of the forward type was proposed by Myers and Thompson 
who examined the issuance of commodity linked bonds for LDC debt. The bond they 
propose rises or falls depending on the value of an underlying commodity. In general the 
terminal value of a zero-coupon bond is given by 
(21)  0
0
(, ) ( ) forward T
F
B TF P P
P
=+ −  
which is equivalent to a hedged position with a long forward contract. If prices rise in the 
LDC then the terminal value of the bond increases, but when prices fall the amount to be 
repaid falls.  
In 1980 the Sunshine Mining Company issued 15-year silver-linked bonds with 
each $1,000 of par linked to 50oz of silver and a coupon rate of 8.5%. The bonds had a 
special feature in that they were redeemable only if the price of silver was in excess of 
$U.S. 40/oz in 1995. In other words, the redemption value was zero if prices fell below 
$40 with probability ρ. The expected value of this bond at T was 
 
(22)  ˆˆ (, ) ( )0 (1 ( )) , [ [0, ] TT
FF
BT c P P P PM a xFx M a x P T x x
ρρ   =+ < +− < + −    
 
 
where x (x=50) is a quantity reference. For x=50 the initial reference price was $20/oz 
($1,000/ 50 oz). The option gain Max(0, PT-20) would only occur if PT>40. At expiration 




(, ) 85 ( 40) 1,000,50 [0,
50 50
TT BT P M a x M a x P ρ
    =+ > + −        
. 
In other words, if the price was less than $40/oz the expiration payoff would include only 
the coupon. 
A similar type of protected bond was a $U.S.20m petroleum bond issued  in 1981 
by the Petro-Lewis corporation. These were 5-year bonds with a 5% coupon. At maturity 
the notes offered a capped share in price gains. Based on 18.5 barrels of crude oil, a 
shared gain occurred if prices increased between $38 and $68/barrel. The general form is 
given by 
 
(24)  [ ] 0m a x 0 (, ) 0, ( ), ( ) oil T oil BT c F M a x M i nx P P x P P  =+ + − −   
 
or after substituting for known values 
 
(25)  [ ] (, ) 0,18.5 ( 36.16),(68 36.16 T BT c F M a x M i nP  =+ + − −   
 
A different type of 3-year petroBond was issued by the Government of Mexico in 
the late 1970’s. Each 1,000 peso bond was linked to 1.95354 barrels of oil, and each bond 
had a coupon of 12.65823%. At maturity the holder received either the face value of the 





(, ) , oil T t B Tc M a x F x P c

=+ + 
 ∑  
 
or upon substitution of known values the terminal payment was 
 
(27)  . 
3
1





Funds have also been raised using commodity-linked preferred shares. Cominco 
Ltd raised $US $54M in preferred shares. Each preferred share had a warrant convertible 











η =  



















Similarly, Echo Bay Mines issued gold indexed securities in the form of $1,550,000 
preferred voting shares. Each share was comprised of a $U.S. 3.00 coupon plus four gold 
warrants. Each warrant was linked to 0.0706 ounces of gold at $US 595/0z. 
(30)
 
1234 _ 1 0 2 0 3 0 4 0 (, , , , ) ( ( ,0) ( ,0) ( ,0) ( ,0)) oz gold T T T T B T T T T x Max P P Max P P Max P P Max P P =− + − + − + −
An alternative means of linkage is through the coupon rate. In 1988 Magna Corp issued 
10-year copper indexed notes with the coupon rates linked to the price of copper. In this 
case the coupons were a random variable based upon the underlying value of the index I; 
(31)    ( , ) cc f I t = 
Assuming a Brownian motion in I,  
(32)  dI I dt I dw α σ =+  
then by Ito’s lemma 
(33) [ ] cc Id t d w α σ =+   
with expected value 
(34) [ ] [ ] T Ec c E T α =  
and variance 
(35) 
22 [] T Var c c T σ =  
The expected value of the bonds for any t was then given by 
(36)    (, ) [ ]
rT Vt E c F e
− =+
  13In another example the French government in 1973 issued 7% gold linked bonds 
with the redemption value indexed to the price of 1kg of gold. Each bond had a safeguard 
clause that both the coupon and the face value would be indexed if the Franc lost parity 
with gold. In this instance the payoff was of the forward type. Let  ( , ) f It define the 
index-based safeguard clause. Then the terminal payoff value can be described by 
 
(37) (, ) ( , ) B Tc F F f I T =+ +  
 
which can be written more generally as  
 
(38)  0 (, ) ( ) T B Tc F P P φ =+ + − . 
The payoff is even specific and is based on the probability of a specific event occurring in 
order to trigger the safety clause. 
 
(39) (, ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( , ( , )) B Tc t T F t T M a x F F f I T ρ ρ =+ ≤ +− ≤  
 
But the safety clause also affected the coupon rate in the following way. 
 
(40) ( ) (1 ( )) ( , )) ct T c t T c f I t ρ ρ =≤+ −≤   
 
so that the coupon payment was a random variable expressed as 
 
(41) ( ) (1 ( )) ( , ( , )) ct T c t T M a x c c f I t ρ ρ =≤+ −≤   
 
Jin and Turvey (2002) provide one of the first examples dealing with agriculture. 
In their model they consider the value of an option linked to the value of a farm loan or 
mortgage. Defining c as the amortized, periodic, loan payment the payment schedule in 






(, ) ( ,0)






Bt c M a x P P
P
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In this formulation the option value has a random strike price based upon the price 
received in the preceding period, so the option value changes from year to year even if 
the amortized payment does not. 
 
VII. Discussion 
  There are several considerations described in the preceding theory and review. 
First, all food firms face risks in the procurement or sales of their products. Theory 
suggests that in the absence of contingent markets these firms would face increasing 
financial risk and reduce investment in capital. Furthermore, in the absence of contingent 
markets, the volatility in commodity prices may be sufficiently high to reduce access to 
debt markets. Under these conditions an alternative strategy is to issue commodity-linked 
  14bonds whose payment structure is linked to the price of an underlying commodity (or 
basket of commodities). 
  This paper has argued that commodity-linked credit can achieve these goals for 
food firms ranging from primary agriculture to marketing and warehousing and food 
processing. The structure of the proposed products can be varied. In some cases, a 
commodity linked bond can be structured to provide an incentive to investors by sharing 
in any profit gains from price movements. These bonds would normally be sold at a 
premium with the firm in essence selling an option to the investors. But if the goal is to 
hedge financial risks, CLB’s can also be constructed that reduce the loan principle or 
coupons depending on price movements. Depending on the underlying commodity risks, 
these would normally be sold at a discount. Essentially the firm is purchasing an option 
from the investors. 
  For simple CLB’s the payoff function can be constructed by using market based 
instruments, as long as any bond or loan covenants do not restrict derivatives investment. 
But these markets are sometimes not perfect and bundling the bond and commodity risk 
management can be an optimal strategy. In addition, CLBs can offer significant 
flexibility in risk management. Conceptually, firms trading in many commodities may 
want to construct a CLB with the payout based on a bundle of commodities to better 
match inventories and product lines, or if the main risk is volumetric rather than market, 
firms can issue weather-linked bonds. 
  This paper was developed at the conceptual level and did not provide any 
estimates of bond prices. Jin and Turvey (2002) provide some estimates for a simple 
structure. Nonetheless, for most CLB’s the mechanics of pricing can be quite difficult 
and would require using Monte Carlo approaches. Closed form solutions are very 
difficult to obtain. In addition, this paper did not explore linking to commodities that are 
not traded. In that case the commodity part would require explicit consideration of the 
market price of risk 
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